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To solve problems such as climate change, every little push counts. Community energy 
schemes are a popular policy targeted to reduce a country’s carbon emissions but the 
effect they have on energy use depends on whether people can work together as a com-
munity. We often find ourselves caught in a dilemma: if others are not doing their bit, why 
should I? In our experiment, participants (N = 118) were matched in groups of 10 to play 
in a collective-risk game framed as a community energy purchase scheme. They made 
only one decision about energy use for their virtual household a day, while a full round 
of the game lasted 1 week in real time. All decisions were entered via personal phone 
or a home computer. If in the end of the week the group exceeded a pre-paid threshold 
of energy use all group members would share a fine. Each day participants received 
feedback about decisions of their group partners, and in some groups the feedback was 
manipulated as high (unfair condition) or low (fair condition) use. High average group use 
created individual risk for participants to be penalized in the end of the week, even if they 
did not use much themselves. We found that under the risk of having to pay a fine, par-
ticipants stayed significantly below the fair-share threshold regardless of unfair behavior 
of others. On the contrary, they significantly decreased their consumption toward the 
end of the game. Seeing that others are doing their bit – using a fair-share – encouraged 
people to take advantage of the situation: those who played against fair confederates 
did not follow the normative behavior but conversely, increased their consumption over 
the course of the game. These opportunistic strategies were demonstrated by impulsive 
participants who were also low in punishment sensitivity. We discuss the findings in the 
light of policy research as well as literature on cooperation and prosocial behavior.
Keywords: cooperation, collective-risk social dilemma, public good, community energy, environmental behaviour, 
impulsivity, punishment sensitivity, collective purchasing
inTrODUcTiOn
Many environmental choices represent social dilemmas (Irwin and Berigan, 2013), whether they 
are large-scale decisions about climate change mitigation (Milinski et al., 2008) or everyday choices 
such as recycling (Lyas et al., 2004) and responsible energy use at home (Leygue et al., 2014). Social 
dilemmas are scenarios when the communal resources have to be maintained and individuals face 
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a dilemma between either using more than others, while sharing 
the costs of usage equally  –  thus, free-riding; or using a fair-
share that allows maintaining the consumption of a resource but 
often with smaller immediate personal benefits. A type of social 
dilemma – a collective-risk game – is relevant to various social 
scenarios with repeated interactions and previously has been 
studied in the context of climate change mitigation (e.g., Milinski 
et al., 2008). Understanding how people act in dilemmas, such 
as climate change mitigation, is of high importance. However, 
realization of policy makers’ decisions relies as much on small 
everyday choices of regular people as on large-scale choices 
about climate change mitigation by the leaders of policy mak-
ing. Currently, there is not enough understanding of what people 
will do given various policy scenarios. We introduce a novel 
“in-the-wild” design of a social dilemma experiment. It takes an 
experimental laboratory game to everyday environments while 
still keeping the structure of the experimental social dilemma 
game. Through revealing people’s behavioral strategies in the 
situations that resemble real-world scenarios while keeping 
experimental control, this approach can serve as an alternative 
or a precursor to expensive field studies helping to understand 
barriers and enablers of behavior change in the domain of energy 
use as well as other domains of behavior.
community energy Purchase schemes
Cooperation around environmental resources is vital. For 
example, to achieve an 80% reduction of carbon emissions target 
by 2050, UK energy end-users  –  households, businesses, and 
third sector – are expected to use energy more efficiently, which 
among other measures includes better management of supply and 
demand. The benefits of encouraging communities to engage in 
managing their energy consumption is outlined in UK govern-
ment’s first Community Energy Strategy (DECC, 2014), which 
presents a range of initiatives that are to be supported going 
forward. One of these initiatives is collective purchasing, which 
“can make things cheaper, as buying in larger volumes usually 
means better deals and lower prices” (www.gov.uk/government/
policies). Although examples are few and far between, the 
personal financial benefits to those who participate in collective 
purchasing have been demonstrated (Conaty and Mayo, 2012): 
for example, in the UK, an average saving of £131 was realized 
by households on the Cheaper Energy Together scheme [DECC, 
2013; for similar evidence from Belgium, see Erbmann et  al. 
(2009)]. Importantly, collective purchasing initiatives could also 
help to achieve carbon emissions targets by increasing engage-
ment of community members in energy issues, and by reducing 
a variety of related emissions (e.g., the reduction in emissions 
related to the delivery of fuel, DECC, 2014, p. 6).
However, community energy purchase schemes can introduce 
interdependence of individual decisions, and so participating 
households might face a scenario alike a standard social dilemma. 
This is not accounted for in the policy documents, which focus 
on the positive outputs of a community purchasing initiative. 
Researchers have shown that near-future changes in energy 
infrastructure, e.g., forthcoming smart meter rollouts in the UK, 
will make it easier to identify which consumers might benefit 
by forming collectives (Vinyals et al., 2012) and what the tools 
might look like that help collectives deal with energy retailers 
(Ramchurn et al., 2013). However, in reality communities can be 
transient and marginalizing (Harvey and Braun, 1999), particu-
larly to those not predicated toward collective action (Hoffman 
and High-Pippert, 2010), and reactions to energy initiatives 
by different communities will not necessarily remain positive 
(Walker et al., 2010).
If one of the households in the community, despite an agree-
ment, uses unreasonably high amounts of energy and if there 
is no opportunities to punish the free-rider (Fehr and Gachter, 
2002), will the rest of the community compensate for them by 
using less? Or will they retaliate and use more themselves, caus-
ing a rebound effect (Greening et al., 2000), thus eliminating the 
benefits of the deal secured by the community? Furthermore, 
if some households use a fair-share amount, will others follow 
an establishing norm of cooperation in the group? The present 
study used a collective-risk game, a type of experimental social 
dilemma, to model a communal energy purchase scenario “in 
the wild.” We investigated participants’ responses to free-riding 
or fair-share use in their group as they were going about their 
everyday lives, as well as what consequences the dynamic inter-
actions over communal resources had on cooperation around 
energy use.
social Dilemmas to explain environmental 
Decisions
While standard social dilemmas are conceptually applicable to 
many real-world scenarios, the predominant body of research in 
the area uses stripped down storylines where participants make 
decisions about money units (MUs, e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2002). 
Building on previous research (Milinski et al., 2008; Jacquet et al., 
2013; Leygue et al., 2014), we transformed a laboratory game to 
investigate whether previous experimental findings apply to more 
realistic, ecologically valid real-world choices. Such an approach 
can build a basis for establishing the constraints of current policy 
strategies on behaviors in schemes such as community energy 
purchase deals. We improved the design of the laboratory game by 
introducing a novel “in the wild” aspect, which aimed to enhance 
the ecological validity of the experiment where the decisions were 
made on a timeline that is closer to real-world scenarios, as well as 
in the familiar environment of participants’ everyday life.
A collective-risk game is a scenario where a group of players 
interact over a course of several rounds. They are given individual 
endowments and have to accumulate (or save, depending on the 
framing) a certain amount of money in the public pot over the 
course of the game. If by the end of the game they do not collect 
enough money (or if they overspend), they are all fined equally. 
We applied a collective-risk game approach to study household 
energy decisions by simulating everyday choices in a controlled 
experimental design. Will a group of households participating 
in  a community energy purchase scheme with a pre-defined 
limit of energy allowance manage to stay below the threshold, 
given the benefits of individual use? To study this question, we 
modified a previously reported design (Milinski et al., 2008) to fit 
a community energy-buying storyline. In our experiment, if the 
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group went over the threshold, the fine occurred with 100% prob-
ability. The fine was distributed among group members regardless 
of their usage from the communal resource, which is similar to 
previous research using experimental public goods games (e.g., 
Croson, 2007). Such a scenario simulates more realistically the 
case of community energy purchase as, unlike climate change that 
can happen with a particular probability, energy use in real life 
can be measured objectively, so its over-usage would be fined with 
100% certainty.
In previously reported collective-risk games, participants 
interacted over a number of turns with the aim to reach a collective 
target of contributions (Milinski et al., 2008; Santos and Pacheco, 
2011; Jacquet et al., 2013). Such give-some scenarios model social 
decision-making in situations such as climate change mitigation 
(e.g., everybody needs to contribute enough to prevent a catas-
trophe of climate change). However, there are many real-world 
scenarios in for example, community buying schemes or house-
hold energy use, which could be better represented by take-some 
games (Leygue et  al., 2014). In these scenarios, a community 
has to maintain the use of a communal resource under a certain 
threshold to avoid negative consequences, such as exhausting the 
resource (Van Dijk et al., 2003) or paying a fine for over-usage.
Importantly, similar to many real-life situations, in the collec-
tive-risk game participants receive frequent feedback about the 
behavior of others in the group throughout the game; however, 
the outcome for the whole game was only evident in the end. This 
introduced a dilemma to each individual group member. If the 
target was not met, the whole group suffered: every individual 
had to contribute equally to the fine. However, by using more 
individually, participants received greater private benefit. This 
could be especially tempting in the short-term given the structure 
of the game: participants were rewarded through individual usage 
on each turn, but rewards for cooperation or punishment for not 
meeting the target were distant and were revealed only in the end 
of the game. Such a set up gives an opportunity to study how 
participants react to the behavior of others and adjust their game 
strategy if necessary in order to reach the target. While achieving 
the collective target implies some individual sacrifice, it brings 
benefits to everybody in the group. However, there is always 
uncertainty for the individual about whether others in the group 
choose to cooperate or to free ride. Furthermore, collective-risk 
games allow the study of strategies that are dependent on the 
behavior of others. For example, one can compensate for free-
riding of others (Milinski et al., 2008). Alternatively, one can also 
be opportunistic and expect others to compensate. Thus, the key 
feature of this experimental design is to observe how the behavior 
of others can affect people’s choices in the game.
The behavior of others often serves as a cue eliciting certain 
norms of interaction, which people then can choose to follow 
(Biel and Thøgersen, 2007), and this is applicable to social dilem-
mas (Weber and Murnighan, 2008). However, do people always 
follow the example of the majority? Research on social norms, 
including energy use domain, suggests that the majority comply 
with normative usage after seeing the information about others’ 
behavior (Schultz et al., 2007). Feedback about behavior of others 
is referred to as a descriptive norm of behavior, which in addition 
to injunctive norms (rules or standards of behavior), is suggested 
to affect people’s choices. However, the feedback about behavior 
of others does not always affect decisions in a positive way, espe-
cially in the household energy use domain (Leygue et al., 2014). 
Field studies on household energy use also report “rebound” 
effects: if people find out that others use more than them, in 
some circumstances they can increase but not decrease their use 
(Schultz et al., 2007). One potential explanation for this rebound 
effect relates to scenarios perceived as social dilemmas where high 
usage by others could be perceived as unjust. In this case, instead 
of following the majority and using a fair-share, individuals could 
increase their usage in retaliation toward free-riders.
strategies to Deal with Unfair Behavior  
of Others
Fairness is an important principle of human interactions. It is 
pervasive throughout human society: we often expect others to 
behave in a way that is fair to us and others (Binmore, 2014). 
Strong reciprocity theory suggests that violation of the fairness 
principle evokes strong negative emotional and behavioral 
reactions such as altruistic punishment of free-riders (Fehr 
and Gachter, 2002). Ultimatum game (UG) experiments are 
specifically designed to study people’s reactions to fair or unfair 
behavior of others. One out of two players is required to divide 
a pot of money in two parts and the other needs to approve 
the outcome for both of them to receive the allocation. Around 
half of participants in UGs refuse the offer, which they consider 
unfair, even though in this case both parties get nothing (Nowak 
et al., 2000), which is a way to retaliate in response to free-riding. 
Leygue et al. (2014) found that when faced with a hypothetical 
scenario in which one house member overused energy and eve-
rybody has to share the bill for their overuse, participants report 
heightened anger. But would they retaliate and increase their 
energy use, as strong reciprocity theory suggests? Many social 
dilemmas in the real world differ from one-shot UGs as we often 
interact with the same individuals over a number of occasions. 
Retaliation in such circumstances can have negative effects on 
the outcome of interactions, especially if there is no opportunity 
to directly punish free-riders: often retaliation causes complete 
elimination of cooperation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). This 
is a highly undesirable outcome for various real-life situations, 
including community energy purchasing scenarios. Luckily, 
there are other strategies to deal with free-riding that are 
also at play in social dilemmas (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; 
Fudenberg et al., 2012).
The literature reports a variety of “nice” strategies in social 
dilemmas, which under certain circumstances lead to better 
payoffs for the individuals employing them. In the repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma between one- and two-thirds of participants, 
depending on conditions, demonstrate lenient strategies by not 
retaliating to defection straightaway and forgiving strategies by 
attempting to restore cooperation after inflicting punishment on 
the free-rider (Fudenberg et al., 2012). Furthermore, in a repeated 
social dilemma experiment, participants who consistently con-
tribute a high amount to the communal account influence others 
through establishing a norm of cooperation in the group at no 
cost to themselves and often with some gain, which subsequently 
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leads to increase in cooperation levels in those groups (Weber and 
Murnighan, 2008).
Previous research on collective-risk dilemmas has not looked 
into strategies in response to fair or unfair behavior of others, 
as well as whether normative behavior presented as feedback 
about decisions of others influences individual choices. However, 
Milinski et al. (2008) demonstrated that if the punishment was 
highly probable, more participants showed altruistic or compen-
sating strategies, while if the punishment was expected with a low 
probability, a higher proportion of participants were opportunis-
tic or free rode. This is relevant because similar to high versus low 
probability of punishment, unfair versus fair behavior of others 
throughout the game in the collective-risk dilemma, respectively, 
could be perceived by an individual as a higher versus lower 
chance of having to pay a fine in the end.
We predicted that in the community energy purchase game 
when others are using a fair-share [similar to Milinski et al. (2008) 
uncertain punishment condition], participants would realize that 
the fine is not likely to occur, so they could increase their usage, 
thus demonstrating opportunistic strategies. An alternative reac-
tion to fair-share behavior of others would be adherence to the 
social norm of behavior (Biel and Thøgersen, 2007; Schultz et al., 
2007) and usage of a fair-share amount.
When others are unfair, in the absence of opportunity to directly 
punish free-riders, two reactions are possible. First, in accord 
with retaliation literature, participants in the community energy 
purchase game could employ an emotionally driven retaliation 
strategy to punish free-riders or increase their usage. However, 
this behavior is highly undesirable from the rational point of view 
as it increases the risk of not meeting the target and, thus, might 
lead to punishment in the form of a fine for everybody. Thus, 
similar to Milinski et al. (2008) in certain punishment conditions, 
participants could use an alternative strategy and decrease their 
usage or compensate if others were unfair.
individual Differences in social Dilemma
While describing behavioral strategies in scenarios that resemble 
real-world situations – such as communal energy use – can help 
to explain and predict cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes 
for the group, it is equally important to understand the individual 
motivations behind people’s decisions. Overall, research shows 
heterogeneity of behavioral strategies in various types of social 
dilemmas (e.g., Burlando and Guala, 2005; Zhao and Smillie, 
2014); however, this heterogeneity has not been yet explored in 
the real-world social dilemmas, such as communal energy use. To 
identify potential mechanisms, we review literature on individual 
differences in behavior in lab-based social dilemmas.
The heterogeneity in decisions in social dilemmas has been 
linked to a number of psychological factors, such as personality 
dispositions, which reflect individual differences in processing 
rewards and punishments (Scheres and Sanfey, 2006; Skatova 
and Ferguson, 2011, 2013). Dispositional reward and punishment 
sensitivities are key to explain individual behavior in domains 
where reward and punishment processing have been strongly 
implicated, such as prosociality and cooperation (Gintis et  al., 
2003; Gneezy and Fessler, 2012; Van Lange et al., 2014; Zhao and 
Smillie, 2014). A psychological measure that has often been used 
to assess individual differences in reward and punishment sensi-
tivity includes behavioral approach system (BAS) and behavioral 
inhibition system (BIS) scales (Carver and White, 1994).
The BAS scale includes three subscales: two subscales meas-
ure reward reactivity aspects of reward sensitivity [BAS-reward 
responsiveness (BAS-RR) and BAS-drive (BAS-D)], and one 
measures the impulsivity aspect of reward sensitivity [BAS-Fun 
Seeking (BAS-FS)]. Impulsivity is associated with the tendency to 
engage in behaviors which are risky and often require disinhibi-
tion, while reward reactivity refers to propensity to be sensitive to 
opportunities for rewards and rewarding experiences (see Smillie 
et  al., 2006, for discussion of the distinction between reward 
reactivity and impulsivity). These scales were previously used 
to explain behavior in the economic games (Scheres and Sanfey, 
2006; Skatova and Ferguson, 2011, 2013) and, thus, should be 
applicable for explaining behavior in a collective-risk game 
scenario structured around communal energy use. Specifically, 
participants who self-reported high sensitivity to rewarding 
experiences (success, social interactions, etc.) in everyday life 
also demonstrated more strategic behavior in social dilemmas. 
Skatova and Ferguson (2011) showed that high BAS-RR was 
associated with lower contributions in a one-shot public goods 
game after revealing that others in the group contributed a high 
amount. Scheres and Sanfey (2006) found associations of BAS-RR 
and BAS-D with lower offers in the Dictator Game (which is 
similar to the UG except that the respondent does not have an 
opportunity to reject the offer) but not in the UG. Pothos et al. 
(2011) showed that participants high in BAS-RR were more likely 
to defect in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game. In all cases, 
participants high in reward reactivity, made a decision to defect 
while having full control of the situation and no dependency on 
the decision of other people. Therefore, their decision to defect 
could be interpreted as strategic and reflect the ability to bet-
ter learn from reward, which they were getting in this case by 
defecting.
Previous studies that looked into associations between BAS 
scales and behavior in one-shot economic games did not find rela-
tionships between BAS-FS and individual choices. The BAS-FS 
scale has strongest conceptual and empirical links with impulsiv-
ity and diminished delayed reward gratification (Smillie et  al., 
2006; Giovanelli et al., 2013). Individual differences in behavior 
might be associated with differences in reward discounting when 
each turn of the game introduces a conflict between short-term 
private benefit and long-term reward by cooperation. Jacquet 
et al. (2013) demonstrated that discounting mechanisms affected 
people’s decisions in a social dilemma: a greater delay in achieving 
rewards by cooperation made it less likely for people to cooper-
ate in the short term in a collective-risk dilemma. Specifically, 
when individuals received benefits from cooperation the day after 
they played the game, 7 out 10 groups succeeded in reaching a 
cooperation target. However, when the benefits from coopera-
tion were delayed by 7 weeks, only 4 groups out of 11 succeeded. 
They also demonstrated variability in individual responses: some 
groups were able to reach cooperation even when the benefits 
were delayed by 7 weeks. Previous research using public goods 
games found a negative association between cooperation and 
impulsivity but only when the reward from free-riding was 
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tangible (Myrseth et al., 2015). It is plausible that in a game with a 
longer time span, where it is easier to free ride at a given turn and 
get away with it, BAS-FS would be associated with more selfish 
behaviors. That should happen especially when the risk of loss is 
low, as for impulsive individuals it would be easier to disregard 
long-term benefits of cooperation. Instead, BAS-RR and BAS-D 
should be positively associated with strategic behavior, leading to 
high certain profits in any case.
Differences in decisions in social dilemmas were associated 
with low self-reported sensitivity to negative experiences in real 
life (e.g., social disapproval, failure, etc.) measured by the BIS 
scale: participants with low BIS made smaller contributions in 
a one-shot social dilemma while facing the risk of punishment 
(Skatova and Ferguson, 2013). Low BIS was also associated with 
higher proportion of contributing nothing in a one-shot social 
dilemma after finding out that others contributed a high amount 
to the public good (Skatova and Ferguson, 2011). Finally, research 
suggested that interaction between BIS and BAS traits, or broadly 
speaking reward and punishment sensitivity systems, is associ-
ated with various clinical and behavioral outcomes, including 
prosocial and antisocial behavior. Specifically, McCabe et  al. 
(2001) demonstrated that cooperation occurs through a neural 
network, which provides binding joint attention to mutual gains 
with inhibition of immediate reward: those who cooperate inhibit 
the dominant response of getting a quick smaller reward in order 
to gain a larger delayed reward by the means of cooperation.
We predicted that in the situation when others were fair 
and used a small amount throughout, making the risk of group 
punishment for overuse low, those who were higher in BAS-FS 
should take advantage and use more energy to get more private 
immediate benefits. We predicted that if others were unfair (by 
using high amounts throughout the game) and the risk of a fine 
was high, more strategically driven participants (e.g., high in 
BAS-RR and BAS-D) should use less to avoid paying the fine. In 
terms of BIS, we predicted that those who were less sensitive to 
the risk of punishment (e.g., low in BIS) should use more energy 
when the punishment was uncertain, i.e., in the fair condition. 
Finally, we predicted that participants high in impulsivity (meas-
ured by BAS-FS) and low in punishment sensitivity (measured by 
BIS) would be more likely to demonstrate opportunistic strategies 
when the advantage of immediate benefits were high (e.g., in the 
fair feedback condition).
The Present study
Our study extended previous research to reveal whether the 
fair (using the pre-agreed amount of energy) or unfair (using 
more energy than was pre-agreed) behavior of others influenced 
individual decisions over the course of a collective-risk social 
dilemma. Specifically, we employed an experimental game to 
model household energy use in the context of a community 
energy deal, where individuals were part of a group of households 
that collectively pre-paid for a certain amount of energy to use 
per week. If the group overused energy, a fine was distributed 
between all group members equally.
We manipulated feedback about the behavior of others as 
fair or unfair, and investigated how such feedback influenced 
participants’ individual decisions about energy usage in their 
own households, resulting in a variety of strategies: fair-share (to 
use as much as established by social convention), opportunistic 
(use more to gain private benefit even at a risk of a group-level 
fine), retaliatory (increase the usage after facing unfair behavior 
of others), or compensatory (decrease the usage in order to com-
pensate for high use of others and so avoid the fine). We further 
looked at whether the different strategies were associated with 
individual differences in punishment (measured by BIS) and 
two distinct aspects of reward sensitivity: reward responsiveness 
(measured by BAS-RR and BAS-D) and impulsivity (measured 
by BAS-FS).
Our participants made decisions through a smart-phone or 
a home PC while going about their everyday lives as opposed 
to interacting with other group members in laboratory settings. 
In addition, unlike in laboratory settings, where participants 
usually make decisions every minute, our participants replied 
just once a day in the morning, wherever they were at the 
moment, and by using their mobile phone or computer at home. 
This is an important feature of the study as it aimed to reveal 
potential conflict between short-term and long-term benefits: 
participants were rewarded for their energy use every day, while 
the bill revealing potential excess would arrive only in the end 
of the (actual) week. Such features of the game provided a more 
accurate simulation of real-world decisions. The data presented 
in this paper are a subset of data collected within the project. 
Here, we focus on details of the design that are relevant to the 
aims presented in this paper.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
Participants and Procedure
The study was conducted through Qualtrics software. Overall, 
118 UK-based participants volunteered to participate (74 females; 
age: range 25–66, M = 35; 46 were homeowners). Out of 118, 78 
participants partook in fair and unfair condition, N = 39 for each 
condition. For all analyses below, we used only data from these 78 
participants (see Design for further explanation why only fair and 
unfair conditions were focus of analyses in this paper).
We aimed to recruit participants who were responsible for 
paying their own bills as for them the decisions in the game would 
have greater resemblance to real life. For that reason, we explicitly 
sought to recruit a non-undergraduate sample of participants. In 
the UK, students often have their energy bills included as a part 
of a rental contract. In these circumstances, there is no monetary 
incentive to use energy responsibly (as they pay the same amount 
in any case). Participants were recruited in two cities in the 
Midlands, UK via various university-wide mailing lists and a list 
of members of an energy trial conducted by a national energy 
company.
All participants were briefed and debriefed in person. At the 
briefing, they received full instructions and could try out the 
game. They also filled in demographic information and a BIS/BAS 
questionnaire. We used the BIS/BAS questionnaire (Carver and 
White, 1994) to measure differences in reward and punishment 
sensitivities. Participants rated various statements on a 4-point 
TaBle 1 | Person zero-order correlations for Bis and Bas subscales.
Bis Bas-D Bas-Fs
BIS –
BAS-D −0.02 –
BAS-FS −0.13 0.44*** –
BAS-RR 0.43*** 0.37** 0.17
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01.
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scale ranging from “very true for me” to “very false for me.” BIS/
BAS questionnaire was scored as four scales: BIS scale (M = 3.02, 
SD =  0.52, α =  0.77, seven items, example item: “Criticism or 
scolding hurts me quite a bit”) and three BAS scales: BAS-D 
(M = 2.67, SD = 0.60, α = 0.74, four items, example item: “I go out 
of my way to get things I want”), BAS-FS (M = 2.81, SD = 0.58, 
α = 0.72, four items, example item: “I often act on the spur of 
the moment”), and BAS-RR (M = 3.38, SD = 0.47, α = 0.73, five 
items, example item: “When I’m doing well at something I love 
to keep at it”). Table 1 reports zero-order correlations between 
BIS and BAS subscales. For the presentation of results, BIS/BAS 
scores were reversed; so high rating represents high ends of the 
BAS and the BIS scales. There were no differences on any of BIS/
BAS scales between conditions. All scales were z-scored for all 
analyses.
All participants who completed the study were compensated 
£40 (~$61) for their time. In addition, they were incentivized by 
being paid contingent on their choices in the experiment (see The 
Game). In the end, participants were paid additional £3 (~$5) on 
average based on their responses. The study was approved by the 
School of Computer Science Ethics Committee at The University 
of Nottingham.
Design
Participants were divided into three conditions: fair, unfair, and 
real. Each condition included 4 groups of 10. As only 118 partici-
pants were recruited, two participants were lacking to form 12 full 
groups of 10. However, for fair and unfair conditions, it did not 
matter if there was not a full group of 10 as the feedback about 
group behavior was pre-set. Therefore, we assigned 39 partici-
pants for each of manipulated conditions. Thus, we manipulated 
the feedback about the behavior of others in 8 out of 12 groups 
in a between-subjects design as fair versus unfair usage. During 
the game, participants in the “fair” condition received feedback, 
which indicated that others in their group consumed energy 
within the pre-agreed norm, i.e., the group’s deal allocation. 
The feedback was generated to represent a plausible distribution 
with a mean of 3.7 energy units (EUs) and SD of 0.48 EUs. The 
mean and SD was estimated based on the pilot study data. In the 
“unfair” condition, feedback indicated that their group partners 
consumed more than was pre-agreed (simulated in the similar 
way to fair condition, M = 4.4 EUs, SD = 0.47 EUs). The exact 
feedback on each day for each condition can be found in the 
Supplementary Materials. In the “real” condition, participants 
received accurate feedback about the consumption of others in 
their group (M = 3.87 EUs, SD = 0.90 EUs). To avoid deception, it 
was explained to participants prior to the study that some groups 
would receive manipulated feedback but neither experimenter nor 
they would know which group they were assigned to (Bardsley, 
2000). As the purpose of this paper was to investigate the effect 
of fair and unfair behavior of others on individual strategies in a 
collective-risk dilemma, here we only report the results for fair 
and unfair conditions.
The game
The Village Energy Deal
Participants had to imagine that they and nine other households 
in their virtual village were participating in a deal to purchase 
energy communally. The deal lasted for a week and provided 
a pre-paid energy amount for the village (the group of 10 
households), i.e., 280 EUs shared across the whole group. Each 
participant received a 62-MU endowment, of which they were 
deducted 28  MUs for inclusion in the pre-paid deal, leaving a 
remainder of 34  MUs in their private account. This remainder 
could be spent on excess energy use (in response to hypothetical 
situations encountered in the game, as described later), or saved 
to be converted into pounds in the end of the experiment at a rate 
of 1 MU = £0.02. Excess energy use, i.e., any energy used over the 
village’s 280 EU allowance, was twice as expensive as energy paid 
for through the village’s deal, costing 2 MUs per 1 EU. The cost of 
any excess energy that was used had to be paid for communally, 
divided equally between all group members.
Using Energy
The only way participants used energy during the game was 
by setting heating in their individual virtual households. The 
heating was set in heat points (HPs) that reflected a subjective 
energy scale from very cool (1 HP) to very warm (6 HPs). HPs 
were introduced (as opposed to degrees Celsius or Fahrenheit) 
as people have different subjective perceptions of what warm or 
cold feels like. For example, for somebody 18°C at home might 
seem as quite “warm,” while for somebody else it might seem as 
“cold” (Li, 2005). The use of 1 HP resulted in expenditure of 1 EU.
Participants received private incentives to heat their homes: 
1 HP used added 0.25 MUs to their private account. That meant 
the more energy they used, the more monetary benefits they 
would receive after the end of the game. Participants were told 
that all households in the group were similar in the level of energy 
efficiency and how much energy they used regularly.
As a result, if all participants kept their use to the norm, as 
suggested by the rules of the village’s energy deal (i.e., up to 4 HPs 
per day, for 7 days), the group would not consume excess energy 
and not have to pay extra at the end of the week. If the group 
overused, all participants had to share a fine (i.e., pay for the 
excess), regardless of their individual use. Therefore, the scenario 
represented a social dilemma, where private interest (to use as 
much as possible in order to gain a monetary incentive) clashed 
with public concern (to keep the use down in order to avoid a 
collective fine).
Playing the Game
Participants were instructed that one round of the game lasted a 
week, with seven turns. One turn took place each day of the week. 
In the morning of each day of the study, participants received a 
TaBle 2 | Means and sDs of energy use for each day of the week for the whole sample, fair and unfair condition.
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
Overall Mean 3.51 3.41 3.43 3.39 3.61 3.59 3.55
SD 0.79 0.77 0.85 0.89 0.94 0.91 1.02
N 65 64 65 66 66 66 49
Fair condition Mean 3.42 3.37 3.48 3.48 3.81 3.73 4.12
SD 0.79 0.83 0.91 1.03 0.92 0.94 0.99
N 33 32 33 33 33 33 24
Unfair condition Mean 3.59 3.44 3.37 3.30 3.39 3.45 3
SD 0.80 0.72 0.79 0.73 0.93 0.87 0.71
N 32 32 32 33 33 33 25
N represents number of participants responded on each day.
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text message or an email with a link that they had to follow to 
engage in the game. The link provided the following information:
• A recap of the previous day, including the average energy con-
sumption of other members of the village; a reminder of how 
much they used themselves; how many MUs they received as a 
benefit from previous day’s use;
• A summary of the week so far, including how much the village 
had consumed, how much was left in the community deal allo-
cation for the week, and how many days were left in the week.
Following this feedback, participants had to make one deci-
sion about temperature in their virtual house for this day. This 
consisted of choosing a temperature setting from a scale ranging 
from very cool (1 HP) to very warm (6 HP).
Participants were also provided with a background story to 
make their hypothetical day-to-day decisions feel more real. Prior 
to the study, we asked participants to name three close real-life 
friends and/or family members who might come to visit them at 
Christmas. We used these names to individualize the reminders 
sent to participants during the game, telling participants that it 
was Christmas time and that those friends and/or family mem-
bers had come to stay with them. Their additional goal in the 
game was then to make their guests happy by keeping the house 
warm, while also attempting to save the money in their private 
account by avoiding the costs incurred by the group exceeding 
their deal’s communal allowance.
On the eighth day of the game, participants received informa-
tion about energy consumption for the preceding week, learnt 
whether the group had exceeded its deal’s allocation and, thus, 
whether they needed to contribute a payment towards the fine, 
if there was a fine, and how much they had to pay. In addition 
to the decisions about energy use in their virtual house, we also 
measured a number of psychological variables before and after 
participants set the temperature every day. As these variables 
were not the focus of this paper, we are omitting them from any 
further analyses or discussion. After the first week of the study, 
participants participated in an extension of the game with the 
same group partners. Only results from the first week are reported 
in this paper. A complete design of the project is available from the 
first author. At the end of the study, participants were rewarded 
based on the MUs remaining in their private accounts plus the 
participation fee.
resUlTs
response rate
Participants responded on 6.4 days on average and there was no 
difference in response rate between conditions: t (68.77) = −0.62, 
p = 0.54. The rules of the game stated that if participants missed a 
response on a particular day, the temperature they set for the pre-
vious day would be carried over. We excluded from analyses par-
ticipants’ data when they missed more than one response during 
the week. Eighty-five percent (N = 66) of participants responded 
on at least 6 days of the study. Only these responses were used for 
all further analyses. Whenever we presented aggregated responses 
from a specific day of the study, we also excluded participants who 
did not provide responses on that specific day from all relevant 
analyses. Response rate for each day of the study for those who 
responded on at least 6 days for the study was the following: 98% 
(N =  65) participants provided responses responded on day 1, 
97% (N = 64) on day 2, 98% (N = 65) on day 3, 100% (N = 66) 
on day 4, day 5, and day 6, and 74% (N = 49) provided responses 
on day 7. The lower response rate on day 7 can be explained by 
failure of experimental software on that day. On that specific day, 
the reminder that went out to participants contained a link with 
incorrect feedback information. Most participants responded to 
this incorrect reminder, but we had to disregard those responses. 
Later in the same day, participants received a correct link with a 
request to respond again, however, not everybody responded to 
this second reminder. The response rate to the second reminder 
on day 7 was similar across conditions: 24 participants responded 
in the fair and 25 in the unfair condition. We further checked that 
all our results remained the same if we ran analyses on a restricted 
sample of those who responded on day 7 (results are presented 
in Tables 3 and 4).
average Use compared to the Fair-share
Mean use across the week was 3.5 HPs (SD = 0.88) (see Table 2 
for means and SDs of energy use per day, overall and per condi-
tion and Figure 1 for graphical representation). Individual use fell 
in the range of all possible options: participants used from 1 to 
6 HPs, with 51% of all responses falling on the choice of 4 HPs, 
31%, 3 HPs; 9%, 2 HPs; 3%, 1 HPs; 4%, 5 HPs; and 2%, 6 HPs. 
As 4 HPs seemed to be a common option for many (which is not 
surprising as it was suggested as a normative expenditure in the 
TaBle 4 | Model 2: mixed-effects random intercept regression model predicting the usage on dayi.
Full sample (N = 65) restricted sample (N = 48) simulations 
(n = 10,000)
Fixed effects
B (se) 95% cis B (se) 95% cis 1 – βa
Intercept 3.75*** (0.13) 3.53; 3.98 3.82*** (0.16) 3.55; 4.07 1
Use on Day 1 0.42*** (0.07) 0.29; 0.54 0.45*** (0.09) 0.31; 0.60 1
Day number 0.01 (0.02) −0.02; 0.05 0.01 (0.02) −0.03; 0.05 0.12
Condition (0 – fair, 1 – unfair) −0.33* (0.15) −0.58; −0.07 −0.37* (0.18) −0.67; −0.08 0.87
Day number × Condition −0.14*** (0.04) −0.21; −0.07 −0.14*** (0.04) −0.21; −0.06 0.98
BAS-RR 0.03 (0.09) −0.12; 0.18 0.03 (0.11) −0.15; 0.20 0.07
BAS-RR × Day number 0.02 (0.02) −0.02; 0.06 0.03 (0.02) −0.01; 0.07 0.17
BAS-RR × Condition −0.003 (0.17) −0.30; 0.29 −0.04 (0.22) −0.39; 0.30 0.05
BAS-RR × Day number × Condition −0.01 (0.04) −0.10; 0.07 −0.01 (0.05) −0.10; 0.08 0.06
BAS-D −0.05 (0.09) −0.21; 0.10 −0.05 (0.12) −0.24; 0.14 0.12
BAS-D × Day number −0.04 (0.02) −0.08; −0.00001 −0.03 (0.20) −0.08; 0.01 0.48
BAS-D × Condition 0.05 (0.18) −0.25; 0.35 0.07 (0.22) −0.29; 0.42 0.07
BAS-D × Day number × Condition 0.07 (0.04) −0.02; 0.15 0.03 (0.05) −0.06; 0.12 0.32
BAS-FS 0.05 (0.09) −0.11; 0.21 0.15 (0.14) −0.08; 0.37 0.12
BAS-FS × Day number 0.08** (0.02) 0.03; 0.13 0.09** (0.03) 0.03; 0.15 0.95
BAS-FS × Condition −0.32 (0.18) −0.64; −0.002 −0.46 (0.28) −0.92; −0.003 0.66
BAS-FS × Day number × Condition −0.12* (0.05) −0.22; −0.03 −0.14* (0.06) −0.26; −0.03 0.81
BIS −0.07 (0.08) −0.20; 0.06 −0.10 (0.10) −0.26; 0.06 0.19
BIS × Day number −0.08*** (0.02) −0.11; −0.04 −0.08*** (0.02) −0.12; −0.04 0.95
BIS × Condition 0.10 (0.16) −0.17; 0.38 0.14 (0.20) −0.20; 0.47 0.14
BIS × Day number × Condition 0.13*** (0.04) 0.06; 0.20 0.13** (0.04) 0.05; 0.21 0.88
BIS × BAS-RR −0.01 (0.09) −0.17; 0.15 −0.03 (0.12) −0.22; 0.17 0.06
BIS × BAS-RR × Day number 0.05 (0.02) 0.001; 0.09 0.04 (0.03) −0.01; 0.09 0.45
BIS × BAS-RR × Condition −0.01 (0.19) −0.33; 0.31 0.10 (0.24) −0.29; 0.48 0.05
BIS × BAS-RR × Day number × Condition −0.03 (0.05) −0.13; 0.06 −0.04 (0.05) −0.15; 0.05 0.10
BIS × BAS-D 0.02 (0.09) −0.13; 0.18 0.02 (0.12) −0.16; 0.21 0.06
BIS × BAS-D × Day number 0.01 (0.02) −0.03; 0.05 0.001 (0.03) −0.05; 0.05 0.07
BIS × BAS-D × Condition −0.11 (0.18) −0.43; 0.20 −0.24 (0.24) −0.63; 0.15 0.10
BIS × BAS-D × Day number × Condition −0.10* (0.05) −0.18; −0.01 −0.10 (0.05) −0.20; 0.00003 0.45
BIS × BAS-FS −0.12 (0.10) −0.29; 0.05 −0.21 (0.15) −0.45; 0.04 0.34
BIS × BAS-FS × Day number −0.04 (0.03) −0.09; 0.01 −0.04 (0.03) −0.10; 0.02 0.38
BIS × BAS-FS × Condition 0.20 (0.20) −0.14; 0.55 0.48 (0.31) −0.02; 0.98 0.25
BIS × BAS-FS × Day number × Condition 0.15** (0.05) 0.06; 0.25 0.21** (0.07) 0.08; 0.34 0.82
random effects
Intercept σ (participant) 0.42 0.48 –
Observations 435 333 –
Terms of all interactions were centered to reduce multicollinearity.
The table reports unstandardized estimates with SEs in parenthesis and 95% confidence intervals for full (N = 65) and restricted (N = 48) sample. Simulation results represent power 
calculation for each fixed effect at 0.05-level using 100 random samples and 100 simulations per each sample.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, aα = 0.05.
TaBle 3 | Model 1: mixed-effects random intercept regression model predicting the usage on dayi.
Full sample (N = 65) restricted sample (N = 48)
Fixed effects
B (se) 95% cis B (se) 95% cis
Intercept 3.66*** (0.09) 3.49; 3.85 3.70*** (0.12) 3.46; 3.94
Usage on Day 1 0.38*** (0.05) 0.27; 0.49 0.40*** (0.06) 0.27; 0.52
Day number 0.03 (0.02) −0.003; 0.06 0.04 (0.02) −0.001; 0.07
Condition (0 – fair, 1 – unfair) −0.32** (0.11) −0.54; −0.10 −0.39** (0.14) −0.67; −0.12
Day number × Condition −0.15*** (0.03) −0.21; −0.09 −0.18*** (0.04) −0.25; −0.11
random effects
Intercept σ (participant) 0.38 0.42
Observations 435 333
Terms of all interactions were centered to reduce multicollinearity. The table reports unstandardized estimates with SEs in parenthesis and 95% confidence intervals for full (N = 65) 
and restricted (N = 48) sample.
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01.
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FigUre 1 | average use of energy on each day of the week in fair and 
unfair condition. Error bars represent SE of the mean. Dotted lines show 
manipulated groups’ average (fair versus unfair).
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instructions), first we investigated whether the average behavior 
in the game deviated from a fair-share usage (i.e., a choice of 4 
HPs), and whether there were any differences between conditions 
in this respect. On average, participants in the fair condition used 
3.61 HPs during the week (SD = 0.62), while participants in unfair 
condition used 3.38 HPs (SD = 0.58). Both values were signifi-
cantly lower than the suggested “norm” of 4 HPs: one-sample t-test 
comparing a mean usage in each condition to 4: t (32) = 33.48, 
p = 2.2e−16 for fair condition, and t (32) = 33.41, p = 2.2e−16 for 
unfair condition. This suggests that most people did not overuse 
energy to make private profits – they used a fair-share or up to 4 
HPs – even though using as much as possible (up to 6 HPs) would 
be rational due to the structure of the game.
Differences in Use in the Fair Versus 
Unfair condition
Furthermore, we investigated the use for the week day-by-day 
for fair and unfair conditions separately. There was no difference 
in day 1 use between fair (M = 3.42, SD = 0.79, SEM = 0.14) 
and unfair (M =  3.59, SD =  0.80, SEM =  0.14) conditions: t 
(62.91) = −0.86, p = 0.39. To investigate whether fair or unfair 
condition had an effect on individual use, we ran a mixed-effects 
random intercept regression model (Model 1) estimated by 
maximum likelihood using lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2014) 
predicting energy use on each day from condition (fair, coded 
as “0,” versus unfair, coded as “1”). The regression included 
random intercept for each participant to account for depend-
ency between observations. We controlled for the use on day 1 to 
account for individual baseline. We also controlled for learning 
effects through using day number as a predictor: it is possible 
that participants would change their energy use across the week 
as they learn about the game and behavior of others. Predictors 
entered into all interaction terms were mean-centered to reduce 
multicollinearity.
The results (see Table 3) demonstrated that significant predic-
tors of use were the consumption on day 1 (B = 0.38, SE = 0.05, 
p = 0.00001), condition (B = −0.32, SE = 0.11, p = 0.007), and 
interaction of the day of response by condition (B  =  −0.15, 
SE = 0.03, p = 0.00001). Table 2 reports means and SDs per con-
dition per day of response reflecting a steady increase of overall 
use across the week and differences in the pattern of use for 
conditions: the use in the fair condition increased toward the end, 
while there was relative lack of change in use by participants in 
the unfair condition across all days apart from drastic decrease in 
use on the last day before the end of the game, day 7. This suggests 
that there was a general trend of increase in HP use over the week, 
however, it was reversed for unfair condition: participants in the 
unfair condition decreased their use toward the end of the week. 
Specifically, 68% decreased their use on the last day compared to 
the first day, 20% did not change, and 11% increased their use in 
the unfair condition, while 63% increased their use on the last day 
compared to the first day, 20% did not change, and 18% decreased 
their use in the fair condition. The results remained the same for 
the restricted sample (see Table 3).
individual Differences and strategies  
in the game
We further investigated whether individual differences in change 
of strategies in the games can be attributed to personality traits. 
We predicted energy use on each day and used the same specifi-
cation for the mixed-effects random intercept regression model 
as Model 1 to which we added personality traits predictors and 
interactions of personality with other effects. Model 2 included 
main effects of BIS and all BAS subscales; two-way interactions 
between BIS and each BAS subscale; two-way interactions between 
each personality subscale and day number; two-way interactions 
between each personality subscale and condition; three-way 
interactions between each personality subscale, day number, 
and condition; three-way interactions between BIS, each BAS 
subscale, and day number; three-way interactions between BIS, 
each BAS subscale, and condition; as well as four-way interactions 
between BIS, each BAS subscale, day number, and condition. See 
Table  4 for the full specification of the model. All predictors 
entered into the interaction terms were mean-centered to reduce 
multicollinearity. In order to assess the posterior power of the 
results, we ran simulations (Martin et al., 2011). First, we gener-
ated 100 samples of simulated data for all independent variables, 
with each variable randomly drawn from a normal distribution 
with a mean and SD of the respective variable from our sample 
(N = 65), restricted to a variable’s respective actual minimal and 
maximum value. As personality traits (BIS, BAS-RR, BAS-FS, and 
BAS-D) were correlated, their simulated scores were drawn from 
a normal multivariate distribution which, in addition to means 
and SDs from the sample and low/high limits of each variable, 
also accounted for covariance between each variable. Second, for 
each of 100 samples, we simulated 100 vectors of the dependent 
variable (energy use on each day) by using simulated dependent 
variables, as well as fixed and random effects parameters from 
Model 2. Third, we ran regression models, as specified in Table 4, 
with 10,000 sets of simulated data: 100 samples, each simulated 
100 times. Finally, we determined the power of the analysis by 
looking at the proportion of significant results at 0.05-level for 
each of the fixed effect in Model 2. The results of power analyses 
are reported in Table 4.
FigUre 2 | average use of energy on each day of the week grouped 
by condition (unfair versus fair) and four different combinations of low 
and high scores on Bis and Bas-Fs: (1) high Bas-Fs and high Bis; (2) 
high Bas-Fs and low Bis; (3) low Bas-Fs and high Bis; (4) low 
Bas-Fs and low Bis. Error bars represent SE of the mean. The scores are 
corrected for the baseline use in the first day. High/low groups are identified 
based on above/below the mean of a respective scale. Dotted lines represent 
fair, and solid – unfair condition.
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The results confirmed the previous analysis with energy use 
predicted by the consumption on day 1 (B =  0.42, SE =  0.07, 
p = 0.00001), condition (B = −0.33, SE = 0.15, p = 0.032), and 
interactions between day number and condition (B = −0.14, 
SE = 0.04, p = 0.0002). In addition, there was an effect of person-
ality traits. Specifically, there was a positive effect of the interac-
tions between BAS-FS and day number (B =  0.08, SE =  0.02, 
p = 0.001), a negative effect of the interactions between BIS and 
day number (B = −0.08, SE = 0.02, p = 0.00001), a negative effect 
of the three-way interactions between BAS-FS, day number, and 
condition (B = −0.12, SE =  0.05, p =  0.011), a positive effect 
of a three-way interactions of BIS, a day number, and condi-
tion (B = 0.13, SE = 0.04, p = 0.0001), and a positive effect of 
a four-way interactions between BIS, BAS-FS, day number, and 
condition (B = 0.15, SE = 0.05, p = 0.0032). All results remained 
significant in the restricted sample. All effects were detected with 
sufficient power (>80%) at significance level of 0.05. There were 
no effects of BAS-RR or BAS-D on behavior in the game.
To analyze the results of the interactions, we calculated mean 
predicted values of consumption for high- and low-end partici-
pants of each trait, using results of regression analysis, Model 2. 
High- and low-end participants were identified as above or below 
of a respective scale of the sample’s average. We then calculated 
the change for each group of participants (e.g., high versus low 
BAS-FS group) between days 1 and 7 to illustrate changes in 
behavior during the week. Analysis of interactions suggests the 
following interpretation of results: BAS-FS and BIS can explain 
some variability in individual decisions. Specifically, those who are 
high in BAS-FS used more toward the end of the week overall, with 
a predicted average increase between days 1 and 7 of 0.42 EUs, 
compared to 0.04 EUs increase in those who are low in BAS-FS. 
Likewise, those who are low in BIS used more toward the end of 
the week overall, with a predicted average increase of 0.43 EUs 
compared to high BIS group, who had a predicted decrease of 
0.04 EUs. The effects of personality traits were specific to the fair 
condition: only in the fair condition, participants high in BAS-FS 
demonstrated a predicted average increase of their use on 1.28 EUs 
on average between days 1 and 7 (0.33 increase for low BAS-FS 
participants), while low BIS participants demonstrated a predicted 
increase of 1.16 EUs (0.16 for high BIS participants). In the unfair 
condition, both low/high BAS-FS and low/high BIS participants 
decreased their consumption: high BAS-FS on 0.25, low BAS-FS 
on 0.31, high BIS on 0.27, and low BIS on 0.29 EUs. Thus, high 
BAS-FS and low BIS explain some variation in increased use 
toward the end of the week, but only in the fair condition.
Finally, the investigation of the four-way interaction of BAS-FS, 
BIS, condition, and day of response suggests that specifically in 
the fair condition those who are high in BAS-FS and at the same 
time low in BIS produce the largest increase in use: by 2.77 EUs 
difference between days 1 and 7, while high BAS-FS and high BIS 
produced a 0.42 EUs increase, low BAS-FS and low BIS – 0.62 EUs, 
with low BAS-FS and high BIS participants not changing their use 
in the fair condition between days 1 and 7. All participants in the 
unfair condition produced a decrease in use with high BIS/low 
BAS-FS and low BIS/high BAS-FS decreasing on 0.39 EUs, while 
high BAS-FS and high BIS on 0.11, low BAS-FS/low BIS on 0.22 
EUs. The actual aggregated responses of the groups broken down 
by high/low BIS and BAS-FS, as well as by condition for each day 
are depicted on the Figure 2.
DiscUssiOn
Behavior in social dilemmas often depends on what others do. 
After we get feedback about others, we adjust our strategy for 
future interactions. This paper presents the results of a community 
purchase energy game structured as an inverted collective-risk 
dilemma with seven turns before the final outcome is revealed. 
Participants entered decisions simultaneously with nine other 
players in their group using their own smart phones or comput-
ers at home over a course of a week-long game. Each day, before 
they made a decision, they also received aggregated information 
about behavior of others in the group for the previous day. In 
some groups, we manipulated behavior of the group as fair – the 
followed a pre-defined group norm of use – or unfair, where the 
rest of the group used more than was pre-defined.
We find that the majority of participants who were in the unfair 
condition demonstrated generous behavior: 68% decreased their 
use on the last day compared to the first day to compensate for the 
high use of others. This indicates that individuals in groups were 
good at dealing with effects of free-riding of others, especially 
as the punishment for group-level non-cooperation was certain. 
Further we find that the majority of participants in the fair condi-
tion demonstrated opportunistic behavior: 63% increased their 
use on the last day compared to the first day. The findings suggest 
that individuals did not follow either descriptive (“what others 
do”) or injunctive (“what I am supposed to do”) social norms of 
behavior especially under low risk of punishment for free-riding: 
in the fair condition participants used significantly more than 
their group on the last day of the study, while in the unfair condi-
tion significantly less than their group.
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We find that individual differences in impulsivity, measured 
through BAS-FS, and punishment sensitivity, measured through 
BIS, were associated with opportunistic strategies in the fair 
condition. In particular, those who were high in BAS-FS and low 
in BIS used more on the last turn of the game showing over 2 
EUs increase on the last day of the game compared to the first 
day. We further discuss contribution of the results of the paper 
to the literature on social dilemmas, individual differences, and 
understanding of energy behaviors.
compensating and Opportunistic 
strategies in Multi-Turn social Dilemmas
Strong reciprocity theory suggests that if others are free-riding, 
people will punish free-riders even at a cost to themselves (Fehr 
and Gachter, 2002). Our results show that only a small proportion 
of individuals retaliated by increasing their use when others were 
unfair, with the majority being generous and compensating for 
others. Thus, we did not find evidence for strong reciprocity theory 
in our experiment. It is possible that strong reciprocity does not 
explain cooperation in social dilemmas that involve interactions 
over multiple turns. This is in line with previous research sug-
gesting that strong reciprocity cannot always explain how people 
manage free-riding behaviors in social dilemmas (Yamagishi 
et al., 2012). In the case of our game, from an individual player 
perspective, the more others used, the higher was the likelihood 
of the fine for the group. Therefore, the reason why participants 
were generous can be explained by high risk of punishment. This 
is in line with Milinski et al. (2008) who found that in a multi-turn 
collective-risk dilemma in the high punishment risk condition 
more participants demonstrated compensating strategies toward 
the end of the game.
In addition to the risk of punishment, it is possible that partici-
pants were generous in this condition because of the take-some 
framing of the game. This is in line with previous research: it is 
often reported that people cooperate more in take-some dilem-
mas (Van Lange et al., 2013). Furthermore, the instructions could 
have had an influence too: participants knew that their task was 
not to use over the limit as a group. Such instructions could have 
enhanced a goal to achieve the results that were best for the group. 
Previous research demonstrated that goal-orientation has an 
effect on people’s behavior in social dilemmas. Specifically, people 
can assign the importance on self- or other-beneficial outcomes 
(van Lange, 1999) and depending on the framing of the outcome, 
this can lead to either selfish or other-regarding behavior (Van 
Lange et al., 2013).
However, even though in this game the majority of participants 
did not retaliate, this does not mean they were indifferent to the 
fact that others in their group were unjust. Psychological factors, 
such as emotions and cognitive appraisals, are strongly implicated 
in the way people judge a situation that involves unfairness of oth-
ers (e.g., Ketelaar and Tung Au, 2003; Sanfey et al., 2003; Nelissen 
et al., 2007). In our case, even if our participants felt angry, most of 
them did not act on their emotions as demonstrated by decrease 
in energy use in the unfair condition. The result also cannot be 
explained by opportunity to “cool down” (Dickinson and Masclet, 
2015) as the decision of how much to use on a particular day 
had to be made straight after being presented with the feedback 
about others. It is still not clear what the cost of generosity was 
for individual participants in circumstances when others were 
unfair. Being angry and not having an opportunity to deal with 
the emotion (by either reappraising or acting on it) can have det-
rimental effects on one’s wellbeing (Zammuner and Galli, 2005; 
Barrett et  al., 2013) and have negative consequences for future 
interactions (e.g., Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). Future research 
needs to investigate the role of psychological factors on behavio-
ral strategies in multi-turn games, such as collective-risk social 
dilemmas with and without opportunities to impose sanctions or 
act on one’s emotions in some way, as well as what consequences 
psychological factors, such as emotions, could have on people’s 
behavior and interactions beyond an experimental game.
While in the unfair condition, participants were generous, the 
opposite was observed in the fair condition. In this condition, the 
majority of participants increased their use toward the end of the 
game. Contrary to social norms literature (Schultz et al., 2007), 
which suggests that both descriptive (do as others do, in our 
case implemented through feedback about behavior of others) 
and injunctive (do as you think is right, in our case implemented 
through the instruction of normative use of 4 HPs) norms 
guide people’s behavior, in our game, participants did not follow 
the norm of use demonstrated by their confederates through 
manipulated feedback, or as it was reinforced in the instructions 
for the experiment. This suggests the influences of social norms 
on behavior might be weaker if there are other motivations guid-
ing people’s choices, such as getting individual private benefits 
or maximizing individual profit through avoiding a group-level 
fine (Charness and Rabin, 2002). However, as the reported results 
only cover one game, it is not clear what the participants in the 
unfair condition would do should they have another round of 
interactions with their group partners.
Participants in the fair condition significantly increased their 
consumption. The increase throughout the game is in line with 
rebound effects in energy use domain: when presented with real 
feedback about energy use of other households people find out 
that they used less than others, under some circumstances, they 
can increase their energy use (Leygue et al., 2014). Use of over 
the fair-share allowance by 30% of participants at some point in 
the game further indicated a different type of individual behavior 
in response to feedback about others – a type of weak free-riding 
(Keser and van Winden, 2000), which has negative consequences 
especially considering the environmental context of these deci-
sions. While the findings are at odds with social norms literature, 
they are in line with literature on collective-risk games. Milinski 
et al. (2008) demonstrated that in low punishment risk condition 
participants free rode more. In the case of our fair condition, 
participants presumably also perceived risk of punishment as 
low; therefore, they chose to take advantage of the situation.
On the one hand, given the structure of the game, it was 
rational to use more when there was an opportunity, as one 
could get additional private benefits for usage. What is rational 
in the current situation could depend on the context and it is 
possible that our participants just aimed to optimize their profit 
in the game and disregarded the broader environmental picture. 
However, the environmental context of the game puts the decision 
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into a different perspective, as the overarching goal of such energy 
purchase scheme is ultimately to decrease energy use. It is note-
worthy that people still increased their energy use for private ben-
efit, despite knowing that doing so can have consequences for the 
environment. While this result can be also explained by the fact 
that some participants might have not considered environmental 
framing of the game, understanding people’s motivations behind 
free-riding is important, as it can explain why people do not make 
environmentally friendly choices in the real world, including not 
making links between their own actions and consequences for 
environment. For example, future energy collectives individuals 
might employ such opportunistic strategies by accumulating 
more energy than their fair-share in personal storage. Previous 
research suggests that people justify free-riding behavior by 
denying their responsibility for the outcome (Schwartz and 
Howard, 1982) or by convincing themselves that their behavior 
would not make a difference to the group outcome (Kerr and 
Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). It is possible that in the case of this 
game, participants felt that increasing usage would not impact 
the outcome, so they could behave opportunistically. It is also 
plausible that participants behaved rationally and optimized their 
profits. However, whichever reason was driving the behavior of 
the majority, similar choices in real world have negative implica-
tions for issues such as climate change mitigation. Our findings 
can be used by policy makers to develop and model approaches 
to predict and discourage opportunistic strategies. Based on our 
findings, policy makers could benefit by building in an incentive 
structure to encourage cooperation and to prevent opportunistic 
behavior in future scenarios.
individual Differences and Opportunistic 
strategies
While some participants used an opportunity to get additional 
profits in the fair condition, about 40% did not demonstrate such 
behavior: they either did not change or decreased their usage. 
We showed that individual differences in impulsivity and pun-
ishment sensitivity were associated with opportunistic strategies. 
Specifically, participants with high BAS-FS and low BIS increased 
their energy use toward the end of the game significantly more 
than other participants. Results are in line with previous findings 
that impulsive individuals are more likely to be biased toward 
an immediate reward in the situations where there is a conflict 
between immediate and delayed reward (Smillie et al., 2006). In 
our study, participants knew that using more HPs would increase 
their profits, so they received immediate gratification from using 
HPs, while the reward through cooperation was delayed by at least 
one day (in case of the last turn decision) or more days (in case of 
all other decisions). This result is in line with findings of Myrseth 
et  al. (2015) who demonstrated negative associations between 
impulsivity and cooperation when immediate rewards for free-
riding were more salient and tangible. Furthermore, in line with 
predictions, we found that participants who were low in BIS were 
more likely to free ride when the risk of punishment was low, i.e., 
in the fair condition. This supports previous research, suggesting 
that inhibitory mechanisms are implicated in prosocial choices 
as one needs to withhold an initial impulse to free ride in order 
to get better rewards through cooperation in the future (McCabe 
et al., 2001; Skatova and Ferguson, 2013).
Our findings contribute to the understanding of conditions 
necessary in order to maintain cooperation in groups especially 
around environmental issues. For example, Freytag et al. (2014) 
found that intermediate targets featuring environmental protec-
tion as a process helped to improve cooperation in collective-risk 
dilemmas. It is possible that introduction of intermediate targets 
and rewards in a community energy purchase scenario, for exam-
ple, through messages that enhance environmental consequences 
of various decisions or through opportunities for reputation for-
mation could reduce opportunistic behavior in the collective-risk 
game among impulsive individuals with low inhibitory control.
We did not find predicted associations between other subscales 
of BAS (BAS-RR and BAS-D) and behavior in the experiment. In 
previous studies that demonstrated associations between reward 
responsiveness component of BAS, namely BAS-RR and BAS-D, 
and free-riding behavior in economic games, participants had full 
information about behavior of others or control over the situa-
tion while making their decision. Thus, selfish choices of reward 
responsive participants could have been explained by the fact 
that they learned better from reward and made a selfish choice to 
take advantage of a certain increase in profits. In our design even 
for the last decision, there was some uncertainty about behavior 
of others. This different structure of the game can explain why 
there were no associations of BAS-RR and BAS-D with behavior 
in the unfair condition. While we did not find any associations 
of individual differences and behavior in the unfair condition, 
future research could study the motivation behind generous 
compensating strategies in collective-risk dilemmas.
implications for Policy around energy Use
Many researchers highlight that it is important to extend lab-
based paradigms and develop social dilemma research designs 
that help to mirror important features of real-world behavior in 
social dilemma-like scenarios (e.g., Van Lange et al., 2013). Such 
research can help to identify constraints of policies and test out 
model scenarios in various areas of social decision-making. The 
results of the study presented here suggest that community energy 
purchase deals could backfire as we predict that under certain 
conditions people will increase their energy usage, especially if 
there is an opportunity to gain private benefits and the risk of 
punishment is low. Community energy purchase schemes with-
out a system of intermediate rewards and/or risk of punishment 
might not be as efficient as expected. We further suggest that it 
is necessary to study the implications of these schemes beyond 
actual energy use, because opportunistic behavior of others might 
lead to indirect negative consequences on interpersonal relation-
ships in the community. Future research is needed to understand 
psychological cost of generous compensatory behavior that we 
observed in unfair condition, and whether it could spill over to 
other domains of interactions within community.
While our game modeled one specific case of managing energy 
supply and demand on a local level, our results have implications 
to decision-making in other areas of sustainable behavior such as 
household energy use (Leygue et  al., 2014) and climate change 
mitigation (Milinski et  al., 2008). Understanding how people 
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act in dilemmas such as climate change mitigation are of high 
importance, however, we advocate the approach to employ social 
dilemmas to study more local decisions, such as community energy 
purchase schemes. Ultimately, for people, the climate change 
mitigation dilemma consists of small person-level every day dilem-
mas, such as the one presented in this paper. Moreover, research 
suggests that attempts to establish cooperation with large groups is 
less productive than when small groups are involved (Santos and 
Pacheco, 2011). Without understanding how to manage free-riding 
and achieve cooperation on small scale, it will also not be possible 
to resolve the global climate change mitigation dilemma.
limitations
Our study had limitations. Failure in experimental software on 
day 7 meant that all participants whose data were submitted to 
the final analysis saw the feedback about behavior of others twice, 
and on the first occasion the feedback was incorrect. This reduced 
sample size that could have biased the responses and were submit-
ted to the analyses. While our findings are consistent with previ-
ous research both in terms of behavioral outcomes (Jacquet et al., 
2013) and individual differences (Myrseth et  al., 2015; Skatova 
and Ferguson, 2013), the replication of the main findings can help 
to affirm the results. The heterogeneity of responses in economic 
games (which subsequently produces large variation around the 
mean) is well documented (Burlando and Guala, 2005), however, 
future research could also help to explain remaining variation 
that is visible from Figure 2’s SE: specifically, there might be other 
personality or cognitive factors driving variation in behavior in 
the fair condition.
Our study also did not account for a number of factors that 
could have impacted cooperation in the collective-risk game 
scenario: for example, reputation, anonymity, communication 
between group members, and other factors. Research on social 
dilemmas suggests that reputation (Milinski et al., 2002) is key in 
sustaining cooperation in groups. Reputation scenarios assume 
that players responses could be traced throughout the game, 
which was not possible in our design. Decreasing anonymity 
is not directly applicable to energy use at home, as it comes at 
privacy cost (McKenna et al., 2012; Rouf et al., 2012). However, 
lower levels of anonymity than we had in our game – where only 
group-level behavior was shared with others – and some opportu-
nities for reputation building might have improved cooperation 
in a collective-risk dilemma scenario. Furthermore, our study did 
not involve any communication between group members, while 
real-world interactions certainly involve at least some level of 
communication. Communication provides the group with more 
opportunities to self-manage cooperation through, for example, 
imposing social sanctions, such as disapproval (Noussair and 
Tucker, 2005). Future research could look into whether commu-
nication between group partners helps to coordinate the efforts 
around energy use and reduce the level of opportunistic strategies.
cOnclUsiOn
We used a social dilemma – a collective-risk game –  to model 
real-world decisions in a community energy purchase scenario. 
Our study confirms that in order to maintain cooperation the risk 
of punishment should be high and tangible; otherwise, people 
take advantage of the situation and free ride. Specifically, indi-
viduals high in impulsivity and low in sensitivity to punishment 
showed higher levels of opportunistic behavior. We also show 
that when the risk of punishment is high, people compensate for 
others to avoid the group-level punishment. However, the psy-
chological cost is unclear. Compensating for others could come 
at an emotional toll and impact negatively on further interactions. 
Taking advantage at the last moment puts collective good at risk 
in a way that can lead to a disaster, especially in an environmental 
context. We suggest that people should have tangible intermittent 
incentives to save energy and not just be expected to follow what 
others do as suggested by social norms literature. Taken together, 
the findings of the study reported here illustrate the benefits of a 
social dilemma approach to study behaviors around energy use 
and the constraints of policies in the environmental domain.
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